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 The main purpose of this study is to scrutinize the effect of 
consumer’s financial literacy and capacity on the demand for life 
insurance. This study uses the novel household survey data 
conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) of 
2016. The paper finds evidence that consumer’s financial literacy and 
capacity is positively related with a consumer’s purchase of life 
insurance, and these are new critical factors in the life insurance 
demand model. Most of the prior research has focused on the life 
insurance purchase as a function of various socioeconomic and 
demographic variables associated with an individual’s risk aversion. 
 However, this study focuses more on an individual’s psychological 
and behavioral factors while controlling various socioeconomic and 
demographics variables. To measure a consumer’s financial literacy 
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and capacity, CFPB newly introduces the objective and subjective 
financial knowledge, the propensity to plan, and financial socialization 
by conducting the survey.  
Furthermore, the paper attempts to analyze the relationship between 
a consumer’s financial literacy and capacity and financial well-being. 
The financial well-being score is construed as a proxy for 
consumer’s expected utility to demonstrate that life insurance 
ownership induces an increment of consumer’s expected utility as 
stated in the conventional insurance theory. However, due to the 
ongoing endogeneity and reverse causality problem, this hypothesis 
remains for future study. 
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The Effect of Financial Literacy and Capacity 







 Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the degree of inequality 
around the world is at a record high. The World Bank states that a 
lack of financial literacy and capacity triggers the status quo (World 
Bank, 2015). The previous literatures keep warning that a lack of 
financial literacy and capacity leads an information asymmetry to 
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financial consumers, and this asymmetry causes serious behavioral 
biases to reach the suboptimal decision. Even if there is an issue in 
the transaction due to the suboptimal decision, consumers are not 
able to respond effectively or act promptly, resulting in financial loss 
and psychological problems (Bank of Korea, 2019). In other words, 
financial literacy and capacity is strongly correlated with this ongoing 
inequality (Kozup and Hogarth, 2008). 
 The world ends up acknowledging that the policy of providing 
financial education to consumers is critical. In particular, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in the United States 
has put an endless effort on understanding and measuring financial 
literacy and capacity (Bank of Korea, 2019). CFPB had failed to 
identify a yardstick to correlate with financial literacy and financial 
capacity; however, financial well-being is getting defined to use as a 
yardstick to assess the financial literacy and financial capacity since 
the end of 2014. CFPB finally finds the evidence that financial literacy 
and capacity is the determinant of financial well-being (CFPB, 2017). 
CFPB defines the financial well-being as “a state of being wherein a 
person can fully meet current and ongoing financial obligations, can 
feel secure in their financial future, and is able to make choices that 
allow them to enjoy life” (CFPB, 2017).  
 A lack of financial literacy and capacity may also trigger a serious 
behavioral bias against the adequate demand for life insurance, 
causing an underinsured problem. This paper examines as to whether 
the consumer’s financial literacy and financial capacity is not only 
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positively related with financial well-being, but also with a life 
insurance demand. In the CFPB’s data of 2016, it encompasses not 
only respondent’s socioeconomic and demographic variables, but also 
the questionnaires to assess the respondent’s objective (Knoll and 
Hout score)and subjective financial knowledge, financial socialization, 
the propensity to plan, which are the main factors in this study. CFPB 
surveys with these questionnaires to use as the determinants of 
financial literacy and financial capacity. Most of the insurance demand 
studies have discovered several significant factors that lead to the 
demand for life insurance, such as socioeconomic and demographic 
variables associated with risk aversion (Burnett and Palmer, 
1984). However, this paper is a first-attempt study to relate these 
factors construed as behavioral economics. And they show a positive 
significant correlation with life insurance demand model.  
 In addition, most of the previous empirical and theoretical literatures 
have paid all attention to corporate insurance, corporate hedging, and 
corporate risk management from a macro perspective to see an 
increment of firm value. However, the empirical study of risk 
management in individual level at a micro perspective has not been 
devoted yet. Furthermore, the effect of the purchase of life insurance 
on financial consumer’s expected utility has not been clarified. The 
financial well-being score is used as a proxy to measure financial 
consumer’s utility in this study. Since risk-averse consumer 
purchases a life insurance in order to avoid the future uncertainty, 
this behavior enhances the consumer’s expected utility. However, 
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due to the ongoing endogeneity and reverse causality problem, this 
hypothesis has remained for the future study.  
 As mentioned earlier, the previous literatures are briefly discussed 
with regards to a demand study for life insurance, financial literacy 
and capacity, and corporate finance study in section 2 of this paper. 
Section 3 reviews the main variables of this paper and two main 
hypotheses. Data and empirical results are presented in section 4 and 
5, respectively. The paper provides a conclusion and further 
comments on this study in the last section. 
II. Literature Review 
The Life Insurance Demand Study 
 The earlier life insurance demand studies investigate life insurance 
purchases mainly concerned with the microeconomic factors such as 
the demographics of households, and these socio-demographic 
variables are used to proxy risk aversion. According to the 
conventional insurance theory, a risk-averse individual purchases a 
life insurance to avoid the uncertainty of the future. By owning life 
insurance, the expected utility increases. That is, the relative of risk 
aversion (RRA) has a causal relationship with the demand for life 
insurance (Outreville, 2013). 
 One of the main reasons to purchase life insurance is to protect 
breadwinner’s dependent against potential financial hardship or 
distress in the case of the breadwinner’s premature death (Browne 
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and Kim, 1993). As a result, the presence of children is the most 
important factor in the life insurance demand model to distinguish a 
pure effect whether life insurance is purchased by its absolute 
necessity of the insured. 
 Likewise, Truett and Truett (1990) find the effect of an individual’s 
age, education, and level of household income on the demand for life 
insurance. Since the prior researches have been constrained to the 
investigation of life insurance in less developed countries, the paper 
compares the demand for life insurance in Mexico with that in the 
United States. They conclude that the age distribution of the 
population is positively correlated with the demand for life insurance 
in both Mexico and the United States.  
 Besides, a few papers attempt to find the relationship between 
racial/ethnicity and the demand for life insurance. These studies 
examine as to whether race/ethnicity affect risk aversion, which 
positively influences the demand for life insurance. Siegel and Hoban 
(1991), Schooley and Worden (1996), Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) 
state that blacks and Hispanics are significantly less risk-averse 
than whites and other races. On the other hand, Sung and Hanna 
(1996) suggest that although black households earn less income and 
have less accumulated wealth than whites, whites are more likely to 
be willing to take a risk and invest on a risky asset. That 
demonstrates that the protection of these resources is even more 
important for Blacks (Gutter and Hatcher, 2008).  
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 However, Burnet and Palmer (1984) state that “empirical research 
conducted on the topic of life insurance demand has produced mostly 
equivocal results and seems restricted to individual’s demographics.” 
The study has empirically validated that psychographic variables are 
more beneficial to predict numerous types of consumer’s behavior 
and purchasing patterns than simple demographic. They find the 
evidence that individuals who are self-sufficient and believe they are 
well in control of their own wellbeing own greater amounts of life 
insurance. 
 In addition, Gottlieb and Mitchell (2019) find the evidence that, 
ceteris paribus, individuals who are subject to narrow framing 
purchase 25 to 66 percent less long-term care insurance than 
average. The paper states that “the narrow framing effect is an order 
of magnitude larger than the effect of adverse selection and risk 
aversion.” To test the theory, the paper has developed and fielded a 
narrow frame for the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to classify 
those people. 
Financial Literacy and Capacity  
 Rapid growth in household debt raises due to the individual’s lack of 
financial knowledge. Only one-third of respondents across the U.S. 
population comprehend concepts of interest compounding in 
everyday situations. Financial illiterate individuals are more prone to 
experience over-indebtedness (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). The 
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number of studies on delineating and understanding of financial 
literacy and capacity is increasing on and on recently.  
 Lin et al. (2017) find a noticeable difference in demand for life 
insurance by financial literacy, financial advisors, and information 
sources with the data from the literacy survey conducted by the 
Taiwan Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) in 2011. Moreover, 
the paper finds evidence that Taiwan Financial Supervisory 
Commission education program make an increment of the demand for 
life insurance. Another empirical finding in the paper suggests that 
conversations with family members and friends are both positively 
associated with the demand for life insurance.  
 Furthermore, many empirical researches also kick off investigating 
the effect of consumer’s financial capacity in various field. The 
propensity to plan is an indicator of financial capability. Lee and Kim 
(2016) aim to identify the role of the propensity to plan on retirement 
savings and asset accumulation from the 2013 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) dataset. When they perform ordinary least squares 
regressions, as the level of the propensity to plan increases, both 
retirement savings, and net worth increase. In other words, 
households with a greater propensity to plan accumulate more net 
worth that leads to the willingness to participate more actively in 
retirement savings, consisting of individual retirement accounts, 
Keogh accounts, and other pension accounts.  
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 In addition, Lee et.al (2019) investigate the relationship between 
financial knowledge and financial well-being to validate financial 
knowledge is positively associated with financial well-being. 
Furthermore, the study includes the moderating role of propensity to 
plan. After controlling other base variables, financial knowledge and 
propensity to plan are positively related with financial wellbeing.  
 How well an individual is financially educated and disciplined from 
his/her parents can be another factor to enhance his/her financial 
capacity. Manfre (2017) shows that financial socialization received 
early in life is positively associated with general saving habits. 
Furthermore, the effect of parent’s financial socialization on the 
development of children’s self-control skills is a noticeable result in 
the paper.   
Corporate Finance  
 Most of the previous empirical and theoretical literature put an 
endless effort to hedge and manage a firm’s risk from a macro 
perspective to increase the firm value. Insurance is the highest 
percent of products that the firms are taking in order to manage their 
own financial and pure risks more effectively and efficiently. For 
example, Hwang and Kim (2016) examine the effect of directors’ and 
officers’ liability (D&O) insurance on firm value. They utilize a 
sample of quoted Korean companies based on the period in which 
disclosure of D&O insurance policy information becomes mandatory. 
The paper finds the evidence that D&O insurance increases firm 
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value compared to noninsured firms. It also finds that D&O insurance 
provides firms with better growth opportunities, which converts into 
higher firm value.  
 Interestingly, weather derivatives are used to manage and hedge the 
firm’s risk. Perez et al. (2013) identify the fact that weather 
derivatives are used as an exogenous shock to the firm’s ability to 
hedge weather risks. They conclude that they find the evidence 
derivatives cause higher valuations, investment, and leverage. That 
is, firms tend to pay all attention to manage their risk from a macro 
level. Empirical studies show risk management leads to real 
consequences on firm value.  
 However, the risk management of the individual level at a micro 
perspective has not been explored enough yet. The empirical study 
to exploit the effect of the insurance demand on consumer’s expected 
utility is an example of risk management at a micro level. Most of the 
theoretical studies have covered this hypothesis with a certain 
assumption that is the price of insurance is equal. This hypothesis 
can be another empirical research question.   
III. Hypothesis 
 The inequality of financial knowledge, the propensity to plan, and 
financial socialization among financial consumers may trigger a 
serious behavioral bias and end up with being underinsured. In other 
words, individuals do not make an optimal decision and miss their 
“true” expected utility. As a result of that, they will regret the 
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decisions that they made in the first period ex-post (Cremer and 
Roeder, 2012). Following provides several reasons as to why each 
variable is an important factor to the life insurance demand model: 
Propensity to Plan  
According to the theory of the propensity to plan, households have 
control problems in matching with their long-term motives and 
current actions. Furthermore, they have different attitudes and 
aptitudes that enable them to assist in achieving long-term goals. 
Thus, the propensity to plan reflects the intentional efforts made to 
alleviate the conflict between future utility and present satisfaction 
(Lee and Kim 2016). Moreover, Gottlieb and Mitchell (2019) 
empirically test that a narrow framing causes insurance underinsured. 
Therefore, a myopic individual who has a lower propensity to plan 
has a tendency to demand life insurance less likely.    
Financial Knowledge 
Generally, a life insurance policy is confusing and complicated to fully 
comprehend. Thus, individuals who are in need of life insurance fail 
to purchase life insurance adequately due to a lack of financial 
knowledge. Dalkilic and Kirkbesoglu (2015) empirically examine the 
relationship between financial literacy and insurance awareness over 
400 university students from a different financial academic 
background. They find the evidence that the differences between 
insurance awareness of students who took finance courses and the 
non-finance course are statistically significant. Furthermore, 
- 11 - 
subjective financial knowledge refers to the individual’s confidence, 
which is positively correlated with an individual’s financial and risk 
managing behaviors, such as purchasing life insurance (Robb and 
Woodyar, 2011). That demonstrates the objective and subjective 
financial knowledge have a positive association with the demand for 
life insurance.  
Financial Socialization 
Financial Socialization is defined as “the process of acquiring and 
developing values, attitudes, standards, norms, knowledge, and 
behaviors that contribute to the financial viability and individual well-
being” (Danes, 1994). In addition, financial education from parents in 
early may affect individuals’ saving behavior (Manfre, 2017). 
Financial socialization is a reflection of an individual’s saving behavior, 
which directly connects to the demand for life insurance. To sum up, 
the following behavior hypothesis is the main hypothesis of this study:  
Hypothesis 1: Objective and subjective financial knowledge, the 
propensity to plan, and financial socialization have a positive 
significant relationship with a life insurance demand.  
 Furthermore, of the individuals who do need life insurance, these 
financial literacy and capacity variables make more pronounced to the 
demand model. As explained earlier, the presence of children that the 
individual supports financially is critical to life insurance demand. 
Therefore, the adequacy of life insurance is an important aspect of 
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understanding and delineating the reasons why these factors are 
more pronounced to the model.  
 Hypothesis 2: Objective and subjective financial knowledge, the 
propensity to plan, and financial socialization are more pronounced to 
the individual who has children to support financially. 
IV. Data 
 The paper uses the 2016 National Financial Well-Being Survey 
(NFWBS) that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
releases. The survey dataset encompasses respondent’s financial 
wellbeing, as well as measures of individual and household 
characteristics 1) income and employment 2) savings and safety nets 
3) past financial experiences 4) financial behaviors, skills, and 
attitudes. The main survey is conducted between October and 
December 2016. The survey dataset originally includes 6394 
respondents. However, after dropping out those who picked“refused” 
or“response not written to the database,” 5447 respondents have 
left and are used. Since NFWBS study weights to represent the US 
population, the summary statistics and logistics regression that the 
paper employs are weighted. In summary, the CFPB survey data is a 
snapshot cross-section data as of the time between October and 
December 2016.  
Dependent Variable 
 Since each hypothesis has a different dependent variable, two 
dependent variables are used in this study: one for whether a 
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respondent holds life insurance (dummy variable). The life insurance 
in the given data is an aggregate level that cannot be compared apples 
to apples, or which is which. Furthermore, the price of the life 
insurance that the respondent holds is missing in the data; the other 
for financial wellbeing score scaled by the CFPB. To score 
respondent’s financial wellbeing, 10 questions are asked and is based 
on four elements: 1) control over daily and monthly finances; 2) 
capacity to absorb a financial shock; 3) on track to meet financial 
goals; 4) the financial freedom to make choices. 
Key Independent Variables 
Objective and Subjective Financial Knowledge 
This study includes objective and subjective financial knowledge in 
the logistics regression model. For the objective financial knowledge, 
Knoll-Houts financial knowledge scale score, also known as KH 
score, is used. According to CFPB, KH score is scaled by the method 
of item response theory (IRT) which is popularly used in the field of 
psychometric. And CFPB includes the score ranged from -2.023 to 
1.267. The questionnaires of this financial knowledge test are listed 
in the appendix E. Furthermore, the subjective financial knowledge is 
based on the respondent’s answer to the following question: “How 
would you assess your overall financial knowledge?” And it is 
measured on a 7-point scale.  
Propensity to Plan  
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This study uses four propensity to plan items (questions) given by 
the CFPB dataset. Since the CFPB does not include a specific method 
to measure an index of individuals’ propensity to plan, this study 
constructs an index of propensity to plan. Our approach is similar to 
the method reported by the prior researches. The index is combined 
linearly by using a principal component analysis (PCA). The PCA 
result is shown in appendix C. The first of principal components is 
extracted with eigenvalues greater than one. The principal 
component accounts for approximately 69.36% of the total variation 
in the responses to the propensity to plan questionnaires. Each item 
shows a positive component score.   
Financial Socialization 
 The respondents are asked seven questions in terms of disciplines 
and teachings received from their family while growing up at home. 
The answers to these questions are collected by CFPB to measure 
financial socialization. The paper retains a unique index representing 
financial socialization by employing a factor analysis with a 
tetrachoric correlation on those by binary variables as performed in 
the exact same way from the previous literature. The scores of the 
factor analysis account for approximately 63.05% of the total 
variance in the responses to the financial socialization questionnaires. 
The eigenvalue is greater than one; each score is positively 
associated with the calculated index. The result of the factor analysis 
with tetrachoric correlation is in appendix D. 
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[Insert Table 1.] 
 V. Empirical Results 
 The first model in table 2 encompasses only the key variables to 
check the effectiveness of the variables in the demand for a life 
insurance model. As expected, the variables are statistically 
significant and show a positive association with the demand for life 
insurance. When the factors are included in the baseline model, which 
includes the respondent’s socioeconomic and demographic variables, 
the predicting model becomes more beneficial to predict the 
probability than before by approximately 0.88%. And all these factors 
are positively and statistically significant. These are only effective 
on the life insurance model as compared to the health insurance 
model which is seen in model 3.    
 Noticeably, of these factors, the propensity to plan and the 
subjective financial knowledge are not statistically significant in the 
health insurance model. It can be explained that the behavioral and 
psychological difference triggers the result. As explained earlier in 
the literature review, Gottlieb and Mitchell (2019) find the evidence 
that ceteris paribus, individuals who are subject to narrow framing 
have a lower probability to purchase long-term care insurance than 
whom have broad framing. Likewise, a short-term need may be more 
attractive to myopic, and narrow framing individuals (Mitchel, 2003).     
 Furthermore, Robb and Woodyar (2011) state that subjective 
financial knowledge is positively correlated with an individual’s 
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financial behavior which is a proper risk managing behaviors such as 
purchasing life insurance. The result of the model 2 in table 2 shows 
the same consequence with the prior research.  
 The paper standardizes the independent variables to check the 
potential multicollinearity problem. Standardizing the independent 
variable is a simple method to reduce multicollinearity. The result in 
the appendix A table shows that the objective and subjective financial 
knowledge, the propensity to plan, and financial socialization are still 
positively significant.   
[Insert Table 2.] 
 The federal poverty level (FPL) is a measure of income issued 
every year by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
On top of that, federal poverty level determines individual’s eligibility 
for certain programs and benefits such as savings on Marketplace 
health insurance and Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP). The federal poverty level (guideline) provides an 
estimate of the number of people who are poor, the percentage of 
people living below the poverty level, the poverty distribution by age, 
sex, ethnicity, and location. Furthermore, federal poverty level is 
based not only on income, but also on family size. According to 
Healthcare.gov, the household income is divided by the poverty 
guideline and multiply by 100 to calculate the percentage of the 
poverty level. The calculated number will be placed somewhere 
between 0% and 400%.  
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 CFPB (2017) looks at the relationship between financial well-being 
and income through a different perspective by the federal poverty 
level. Individuals whose household incomes are under the federal 
poverty level have an average financial well-being score of 45, as 
compared to 49 for individuals whose household incomes are 
between 100 and 200 percent of the federal poverty level. Moreover, 
individuals whose household incomes are more than 200 percent of 
the federal poverty level get 57. 
 However, the distributions of financial well-being for the first two 
groups (under 100% and 100-200%) overlap significantly. CFPB 
explains that there may be compensations or strategies that help 
individuals whose household incomes are under the poverty level 
(under 100%) exceed the financial well-being of those with incomes 
between 100-200 percent of the poverty level. One of the reasons 
is that individuals who are less than 100% of the poverty level may 
qualify for a greater number of means-tested social safety net 
programs (CFPB, 2017). On the other hand, the amount of overlap 
between these two subgroups and individuals who are over 200% of 
the poverty level is very low.  
 Table 3 employs logistic regression by federal poverty level. This 
study breaks the federal poverty into two subgroups: one for at or 
below the 200%; the other for over 200% as explained in the CFPB 
report. The first group whose household income is at or below 200% 
of the poverty level has 1269 respondents, and the other group has 
4178 respondents. It seems to be that the propensity to plan and the 
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subjective financial knowledge are not important factors in the first 
group. However, the entire factors influence on the second group 
whose household income is over 200% of the poverty level. 
 Consistently, no matter which poverty level individuals are in, the 
propensity to plan and the subjective financial knowledge are not 
significant in the health insurance demand model.  
[Insert Table 3.] 
 As explained earlier, the second hypothesis of this paper is that 
objective and subjective financial knowledge, the propensity to plan, 
and financial socialization are more pronounced to the individual who 
has children to support financially than those who have not. In order 
to check the hypothesis, the interaction term is performed. The main 
purpose of the demand for life insurance is to protect breadwinner’s 
dependent against potential financial hardship or distress in the case 
of the breadwinner’s premature death (Browne and Kim, 1993). 
 The presence of children that the respondent should support 
financially can be a major factor for the demand for life insurance. 
The dummy variable of the presence of children is literally asking to 
the respondent whether he/she has children to support financially. 
This dummy variable can distinguish a pure effect whether life 
insurance is purchased by its absolute necessity of the insured. 
Furthermore, interaction with these four financial literacy and 
capacity variables shows the evidence that KH score increases the 
possibility of the respondents who have children to support 
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financially to hold life insurance. That is, the interaction term 
provides a moderating effect. However, the interaction with financial 
socialization seems not effective on a life insurance holding. 
Moreover, it shows a negative sign in the life insurance model. When 
the respondent who has children to support financially has a greater 
propensity to plan financially, he/she is more willing to hold life 
insurance. Likewise, when the same characteristic individual has 
more confidence in the ability toward his/her financial knowledge, the 
individual purchases life insurance. The results are consistent with 
the adequacy hypothesis of this paper.  
 As did in table 3, the logistic regression with the interaction terms 
is employed by the federal poverty level. Interestingly, when the 
respondent who has to support his or her children financially shows 
a higher score of financial socialization, it’d rather affect the 
respondent’s demand for life insurance inversely.  
[Insert Table 4.] 
 The understanding of adequacy of life insurance coverage is an 
important aspect of the empirical study to avoid the selection bias. 
Mitchel (2003) states that households whose ages are under 25 and 
over age 65 are excluded since they have limited income protection 
needs. Furthermore, some combinations are very unlikely in the 
given data such as young households under 25 with high household 
incomes. In addition, the likelihood that parents of the individuals 
under 25 have purchased life insurance for their children on the 
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behalf is very high. Likewise, the likelihood of vice versa is also high 
for the individual whose age is over 65 which is the average age of 
retirement. It is difficult to interpret that these behavioral economic 
variables affect the respondents who are already retired or reaching 
the retirement age. 
 Excluding respondents over 65 exactly is not feasible due to the 
data limit. The most updated data provides the age range of 62-69. 
For that reason, the respondents under 25 and over 69 are excluded 
from the data. The number of the respondents under 25 is 379. Of 
379 respondents, the respondents who do not hold a life insurance is 
81.79%. And the number of the respondents over 69 is 583. Of 583 
respondents who does not hold life insurance is 43.57%. Therefore, 
962 out of 5447 respondents are excluded from this table. The 
factors are still strongly significant and strengthen the explanatory 
power of the demand model in this study.  
[Insert Table 5.] 
Robustness 
 Knoll-Houts financial knowledge score (KH score) is used to 
measure the respondent’s objective financial knowledge in this study. 
CFPB measures financial knowledge with the 10-item version of 
Knoll-Houts Financial Knowledge Scale from the understanding of 
long-term returns on investment to the understanding of mortgage 
term length on total interest paid. However, of the 9 questions, the 
respondent is asked to check whether he/she is generally 
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understanding of life insurance, which is “Whole life’s insurance has 
a savings feature while ‘term’ insurance does not.” The paper 
considers this item or question can be a factor that triggers a serious 
bias, meaning the understanding of life insurance question can explain 
the explanatory power of the whole objective financial knowledge.  
 This study excludes the questionnaire of the understanding of life 
insurance. Since Knoll-Houts as well as the prior researches use the 
item response theory (IRT), this paper also analyzes the rest of the 
items with a method of IRT by using a statistical software SAS. The 
paper uses a unique index made by SAS.  
 As seen in the table5, the paper successfully gets a pure effect by 
breaking the objective financial knowledge into two variables. The 
result demonstrates that even if there is no item asking whether the 
respondent fully understands life insurance, the general financial 
knowledge positively influences the likelihood of holding life 
insurance. Interestingly, when the interaction term is employed, the 
understanding of life insurance does not affect the demand for life 
insurance. That is, the understanding of life insurance is not an 
important factor to make the individual who has children to support 
financially purchase life insurance. Furthermore, financial 
socialization still seems not as effective as a predictor of the demand 
for life insurance when the interaction is executed.  
[Insert Table 6.] 
 The first logistic regression table, which is in the table2 shows that 
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it seems the objective financial knowledge and financial socialization 
are significant factors; however, the propensity to plan and the 
subjective financial knowledge do not impact on the demand for health 
insurance. Table 2 only checks the behavior hypothesis in the health 
insurance model. The table7 validates the adequacy hypothesis, 
which uses the interaction term.  
 As expected, when the same interaction term is employed, the 
newly introduced factors are not significant in the health insurance. 
That concludes the interaction terms are only effective on the life 
insurance model. Additionally, the health insurance model is executed 
by the federal poverty level. When the respondent who has children 
to support financially has a higher propensity to plan, it alleviates the 
possibility of the demand for health insurance in the range of 0~ 199% 
of the poverty level.  
 Furthermore, when the respondent who has to support his/her 
children financially shows a higher KH financial knowledge score, it 
also reduces the likelihood of the demand for health insurance. These 
results are exactly opposite results with the demand life insurance 
model. 
[Insert Table 7.] 
 The last table of this paper is the purpose of validation that holding 
life insurance increases the consumer’s financial well-being score. 
As explained earlier, the paper attempts to proxy the financial well-
being score as the consumer’s expected utility. The serious 
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endogeneity problem or reverse casualty appears when the ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression is performed. The paper fails to find 
the instrumental variable to execute 2SLS in the given data. 
Moreover, holding life insurance does not affect the financial well-
being score significantly. But the coefficient of holding life insurance 
has a positive association with financial well-being score. 
 Interestingly, the demand for life insurance is more powerful to the 
financial well-being score to the respondent whose household 
income is below 200% of the federal poverty level. This paper cannot 
process further steps with the given data, so this hypothesis remains 
to further development or studies. For that reason, this study puts 
this table into appendix A. 
[Insert Appendix B.] 
VI. Conclusion 
The paper finds the evidence that the disparity of consumer’s 
financial literacy and capacity can trigger the inequality of the 
demand for life insurance. In other words, a lack of financial literacy 
and capacity hinders the proper demand. However, four financial 
literacy and capacity variables which are objective financial 
knowledge (KH score), subjective financial knowledge, the 
propensity to plan, and financial socialization are positively 
associated with the demand for life insurance even after controlling 
for the respondent’s socioeconomic and demographic variables. 
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Furthermore, the empirical results show that these variables are 
more pronounced to the respondent who has children to support 
financially. By comparing with the health insurance model, the paper 
concludes that these variables are only effective and significant in 
the life insurance model.     
However, the dummy variable of asking whether the respondent 
owns life insurance or not that the paper has used is an aggregate 
level of life insurance. That means the paper cannot clarify the two 
questions: 1, which type of life insurance is purchased; 2. What 
amount of life insurance the respondent currently holds. In order to 
identify the pure effect of these variables, the paper should postulate 
that life insurance is being compared apples to apple. Moreover, the 
amount of life insurance is needed for the robustness check. 
The price of life insurance is another problem in this study. This 
study aims to scrutinize the effect of financial literacy and capacity 
on the demand for the life insurance model. The absence of price 
which is the main factor of the supply-demand model is critical that 
may cause a serious biased consequence. However, CFPB’s dataset 
does not encompass the detail of life insurance what the respondent 
holds. In order to alleviate the outstanding problem, this study 
attempts to use enough control variables as possible as it can. 
Furthermore, the paper considers that the association of price with 
the demand for life insurance is another research question that is 
neglected in this study. Lastly, the paper cites the previous literature 
when selecting the sample. However, performing a test of Hackman 
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can be another statistical method to reduce the potential selection 
bias problem.  
To sum up, this paper finds the evidence that people with better 
financial knowledge, better financial socialization, and a greater 
propensity to plan do make better insurance demand. Furthermore, 
when these factors are included in the baseline insurance model, the 
predicting power of the demand model has increased by 0.88%, which 
comes from the value of pseudo R squared. And, the new research 
question, which is“does adequate insurance enhance consumer’s 
financial well-being?”has left to the researchers who analyze the 
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논문 초록 
 




본 연구에서는 금융소비자보호원(CFPB)의 금융웰빙 설문조사 데이터를 
이용하여 금융소비자의 금융 이해력과 역량의 차이는 금융 웰빙지수만이 
아닌, 보험 가입을 저해하는 중요한 행동경제학적 요소임을 밝혔다. 
금융 이해력과 역량을 측정하는 변수로 CFPB 는 생활 주기 모델에 
중요한 변수인 응답자의 객관적/주관적 금융 지식, 계획 성향, 그리고 
재무적 사회화를 이용하였다. 이러한 변수들을 생명보험 수요 
연구모델에 새롭게 추가하여 필요성을 보여주었다. 또한, 현재까지 많은 
이론 및 실증 논문들에서 기업보험, 기업 헤지, 그리고 기업 위험관리를 
통한 회사 가치의 증가라는 거시적 측면의 연구를 보았지만, 미시적 
측면의 위험관리에 관한 연구는 아직 미흡한 상황이다. 보험구매가 
실제로 금융소비자의 기대효용에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지에 관한 연구를 
금융 웰빙지수를 이용하여 밝혀내고자 하였으나, 모델안에서의 내생성과 
역인과관계의 문제를 해결하지 못하여 다음 연구주제로 남겨두었다. 
 
국문색인어: 금융 이해력과 역량, 생명보험수요, 금융웰빙지수 
학번: 2017-27347 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables 
    Observations life Insurance No-life Insurance Difference  Health Insurance No-Health Insurance Difference  
Variables  N Percentage/Mean t-test Percentage/Mean t-test 
Life/Health  5447 52.65 47.35 77.82 71.65 28.35 117.33 
Dependent variable         
     Financial well-being 5447 56.89 51.09 16.00 56.02 49.52 16.81 
Key variable         
   KH objective financial knowledge 5447 0.04 -0.33 17.79 0.02 -0.49 23.03 
   Subjective financial knowledge 5447 4.83 4.40 13.32 4.73 4.36 10.84 
   Propensity to Plan 5447 0.13 -0.12 5.72 0.02 -0.04 1.29 
   Financial Socialization  5447 0.68 0.62 5.97 0.68 0.59 8.19 
   Children that I support financially  5447 61.67 38.33 11.34 73.31 26.69 3.42 
   Homeownership 5447 63.62 36.38 25.54 80.73 19.27 20.92 
   Non-Retirement Investment  5447 65.67 34.33 14.94 86.87 13.13 17.34 
Age        
18-24 379 18.21 81.79 -15.82 48.02 51.98 -10.44 
25-34 1046 43.59 56.41 -6.25 67.21 32.79 -2.73 
35-44 777 53.80 46.20 2.00 70.01 29.99 0.18 
45-54 1016 60.04 39.96 7.54 73.03 26.97 2.50 
55-61 669 61.88 38.12 5.30 74.89 25.11 2.47 
62-69 977 58.55 41.45 3.87 77.79 22.21 4.17 
70+ 583 56.43 43.57 2.02 80.79 19.21 4.03 
Household Income        
$0 to $29,999 984 26.12 73.88 -18.77 42.38 57.62 -22.36 
$30,000 to $49,999 875 45.26 54.74 -4.92 64.11 35.89 -5.74 
$50,000 to $74,000 994 54.33 45.67 2.07 76.96 23.04 3.97 
$75,000 to $ 99,999 821 60.41 39.59 3.87 79.78 20.22 5.25 
$100,000 to $149,999 977 64.69 35.31 7.80 84.03 15.97 9.39 
$150,000 or more 796 68.72 31.28 11.18 85.93 14.07 10.68 
Education        
less than high school 345 26.09 73.91 -12.68 39.71 60.29 -14.00 
High school diploma 1305 45.52 54.48 -6.27 62.22 37.78 -7.99 





Bachelor's degree 1164 59.97 40.03 8.75 83.16 16.84 12.17 
Post-Bachelor's degree 950 65.05 34.95 9.73 86.32 13.68 10.87 
Racial/ethnic status         
Whites 3790 57.18 42.82 11.59 78.47 21.53 17.81 
Blacks 586 56.41 43.59 0.61 61.95 38.05 -4.45 
Hispanics 769 33.16 66.84 -12.89 48.24 51.76 -15.90 
Asians/others 302 44.04 55.96 -3.77 64.57 35.43 -4.33 
Employment Status         
Self-employed 488 45.90 54.10 -2.67 64.75 35.25 -3.88 
Salaried worker 2450 61.63 38.37 13.27 78.33 21.67 11.78 
No work 242 21.07 78.93 -10.68 42.15 57.85 -10.69 
Retired 1267 55.72 44.28 2.73 79.56 20.44 5.57 
Marital Status         
Married 3285 63.84 36.16 22.79 79.03 20.97 15.76 
Single 1053 28.77 71.23 -18.99 56.03 43.97 -12.46 
Partner 341 34.90 65.10 -6.51 60.70 39.30 -4.63 
Separated/Divorced/ Widowed 768 45.44 54.56 -4.01 66.41 33.59 -3.72 
Location        
West 1286 44.32 55.68 -6.85 69.52 30.48 -2.28 
South 1909 54.58 45.42 2.72 68.88 31.12 -3.54 
Northeast 990 53.03 46.97 0.49 75.35 24.65 3.31 
Midwest 1262 57.92 42.08 3.42 75.12 24.88 3.47 
Gender        
Male 2874 52.96 47.04 -3.24 71.92 28.08 -1.92 
female 2573 52.31 47.69 3.24 71.36 28.64 1.92 
MSA status        
Metro 4724 52.20 47.80 -2.72 71.49 28.51 -1.12 
Non-Metro 723 55.60 44.40 2.72 72.75 27.25 1.12 
Poverty Status        
Poverty <200% FPL 1269 28.05 71.95 -21.27 44.05 55.95 -24.87 
Poverty +200% FPL 4178 60.12 39.88 21.27 80.04 19.96 24.87 
Mean = Weighted / PCT = Not Weighted                
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Table 2. Logistics Regression Models with key variables (Life Insurance & Health Insurance) 
Variables Model1 (Life Insurance) Model2 (Life Insurance, w/ Key) Model3 (Health Insurance, w/ Key) 
  Estimate Pr > ChiSq odd ratio Estimate Pr > ChiSq odd ratio Estimate Pr > ChiSq odd ratio 
KH score 0.3440 <.0001 1.4106 
0.1094 0.0002 1.1156 0.1970 <.0001 1.2177 
Financial Socialization 0.0826 0.0593 1.0861 
0.1922 0.0001 1.2119 0.1866 0.0003 1.2051 
Propensity to Plan 0.0300 0.0085 1.0305 
0.0379 0.0023 1.0386 -0.0013 0.9211 0.9987 
Subjective FK 0.1287 <.0001 1.1373 
0.0411 0.0193 1.0420 0.0111 0.5293 1.0112 
Children that I support financially 
   
0.1834 <.0001 1.2013 -0.0226 0.6246 0.9777 
Homeownership 
   
0.2384 <.0001 1.2692 0.1752 0.0004 1.1915 
Non-Retirement Investment  
   
0.0947 0.0451 1.0993 0.2421 <.0001 1.2739 








-0.7749 <.0001 0.4607 -0.3362 0.0103 0.7145 
25-34 
   
-0.3831 0.0003 0.6817 -0.0774 0.5075 0.9255 
35-44 
   
-0.2829 0.0091 0.7536 -0.1087 0.3580 0.8970 
45-54 
   
-0.1168 0.2530 0.8898 -0.1179 0.2931 0.8888 
55-61 
   
-0.0889 0.3709 0.9149 -0.1149 0.2941 0.8915 
62-69 
   
-0.0261 0.7630 0.9742 -0.0461 0.6358 0.9549 






$30,000 to $49,999 
  
0.2235 0.0005 1.2504 0.2356 0.0001 1.2657 
$50,000 to $74,000 
   
0.3501 <.0001 1.4192 0.4356 <.0001 1.5459 
$75,000 to $ 99,999 
   
0.3703 <.0001 1.4482 0.4423 <.0001 1.5563 
$100,000 to $149,999 
   
0.4313 <.0001 1.5393 0.5101 <.0001 1.6655 
$150,000 or more 
   











High school diploma 
  
0.1256 0.0840 1.1338 0.0271 0.6864 1.0275 
some college 
   
0.2306 0.0021 1.2594 0.0966 0.1668 1.1014 
Bachelor's degree 
   
0.2086 0.0129 1.2320 0.2874 0.0005 1.3330 
Post-Bachelor's degree 
   
0.1931 0.0393 1.2130 0.2932 0.0026 1.3407 








0.2255 0.0004 1.2529 -0.0592 0.3537 0.9425 
Hispanics 
   
-0.2978 <.0001 0.7424 -0.4274 <.0001 0.6522 
Asians/others 
   
-0.1489 0.0314 0.8617 -0.3971 <.0001 0.6723 








0.3175 <.0001 1.3737 0.2638 <.0001 1.3019 
No work 
   
-0.3195 0.0015 0.7265 -0.2322 0.0075 0.7928 
Retired 
   
-0.0681 0.3716 0.9342 0.1465 0.0745 1.1578 








-0.3970 <.0001 0.6723 -0.2299 0.0002 0.7946 
Partner 
   
-0.3131 <.0001 0.7312 -0.1923 0.0161 0.8251 
Separated/divorced/widowed 
   
-0.2837 <.0001 0.7530 -0.1492 0.0143 0.8614 








-0.2298 <.0001 0.7947 0.0733 0.1512 1.0761 
Northeast 
   
-0.0425 0.4229 0.9584 0.1770 0.0015 1.1936 
Midwest 
   
0.0392 0.4406 1.0400 0.1147 0.0317 1.1215 








-0.1431 0.0002 0.8667 -0.1204 0.0026 0.8866 
Metropolitan  
   
-0.1238 0.0259 0.8836 -0.0567 0.3274 0.9449 
34 
Intercept 
   
-0.5156 0.0006 0.5971 0.0022 0.9885 1.0022 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0759 0.2285 0.2037 
N 5447 5447 5447 














Table 3. Logistics Regression Models by Poverty Status, Federal Poverty Levels (Life Insurance & Health Insurance) 
Variables 
Model4 (Life Insurance, FPL < 
200%) 
Model5 (Life Insurance, FPL + 
200%) 
Model6 (Health Insurance, FPL < 
200%) 
Model7 (Health Insurance, FPL + 
200%) 

















KH score 0.1151 0.0615 1.1220 0.0989 0.0029 1.1040 0.1585 0.0044 1.1718 0.2096 <.0001 1.2332 
Financial Socialization 0.2687 0.0078 1.3083 0.1741 0.0028 1.1902 0.2053 0.0244 1.2279 0.1939 0.0022 1.2140 
Propensity to Plan 0.0336 0.1857 1.0342 0.0412 0.0044 1.0421 0.0144 0.5242 1.0145 -0.0094 0.5521 0.9906 
Subjective FK 0.0124 0.6951 1.0125 0.0534 0.0141 1.0549 -0.0198 0.4855 0.9804 0.0257 0.2679 1.0260 
Children that I support 
financially 
0.0851 0.3875 1.0888 0.2442 <.0001 1.2766 -0.1509 0.0920 0.8599 0.0467 0.4104 1.0478 
Homeownership 0.3400 0.0001 1.4049 0.1658 0.0050 1.1803 0.1299 0.1167 1.1387 0.1844 0.0039 1.2025 
Non-Retirement 
Investment  
0.3292 0.0268 1.3899 0.0810 0.1069 1.0844 0.2264 0.1216 1.2541 0.2475 <.0001 1.2808 
Intercept -0.1900 0.4676 0.8270 -0.3354 0.2080 0.7151 0.3649 0.1364 1.4404 -0.0378 0.8917 0.9629 
Control Variables Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.1887 0.1704 0.1531 0.1199 
N 1269 4178 1269 5447 











Table4. Interaction term with a variable of ‘Children that I support financially’  
Variables Model8 (Total) Model9 (FPL < 200%) Model10 (FPL +200%) 
  Estimate Pr > ChiSq odd ratio Estimate Pr > ChiSq odd ratio Estimate Pr > ChiSq odd ratio 
KH score 0.0660 0.0560 1.0682 0.0558 0.4780 1.0574 0.0757 0.0551 1.0786 
KH score * Children to support 
0.1164 0.0260 1.2001 0.1749 0.1317 1.2595 0.0640 0.3101 1.1499 
Financial Socialization 0.2272 0.0004 1.2551 0.5056 0.0002 1.6580 0.1782 0.0145 1.1951 
Financial Socialization * Children to support 
-0.1030 0.2936 1.1322 -0.5552 0.0057 0.9516 -0.0125 0.9137 1.1802 
Propensity to Plan 0.0221 0.1611 1.0223 0.0343 0.3144 1.0349 0.0209 0.2476 1.0211 
Propensity to Plan * Children to support 
0.0428 0.0910 1.0671 0.0129 0.7994 1.0483 0.0559 0.0613 1.0798 
Subjective FK 0.0193 0.3849 1.0195 -0.0561 0.1823 0.9454 0.0470 0.0805 1.0481 
Subjective FK * Children to support 
0.0670 0.0590 1.0901 0.1699 0.0081 1.1205 0.0230 0.6058 1.0725 
Children that I support financially -0.1236 0.4929 0.8837 -0.2699 0.3868 0.7635 0.1265 0.5872 1.1348 
Homeownership 
0.1944 0.0011 1.2146 0.2938 0.0142 1.3415 0.1653 0.0189 1.1797 
Homeownership * Children to support 0.1166 0.1756 1.3648 0.1172 0.4757 1.6322 0.0195 0.8562 1.2030 
Non-Retirement Investment  
0.0983 0.0380 1.1033 0.3374 0.0237 1.4013 0.0816 0.1052 1.0850 
Intercept -0.4108 0.0116 0.6631 -0.0105 0.9707 0.9896 -0.3259 0.2400 0.7219 
Control Variables 
Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.2314 0.1993 0.1717 
N 5447 1269 4178 








Table5 Interaction term with a different age group 
Variables Model11 (age group 25-69) Model12 (age group 25-69) 
  Estimate Standard error Pr > ChiSq Estimate Standard error Pr > ChiSq 
KH score 
0.0994 0.0318 0.0018 0.0483 0.0387 0.2116 
KH score * Children to support 
   
0.1262 0.0536 0.0185 
Financial Socialization 
0.1699 0.0533 0.0014 0.2109 0.0707 0.0029 
Financial Socialization * Children to support 
   
-0.1031 0.1045 0.3237 
Propensity to Plan 
0.0351 0.0135 0.0097 0.0081 0.0179 0.6518 
Propensity to Plan * Children to support 
   
0.0638 0.0269 0.0179 
Subjective FK 
0.0457 0.0190 0.0162 0.0177 0.0250 0.4783 
Subjective FK * Children to support 
   
0.0705 0.0376 0.0610 
Children that I support financially 
0.2191 0.0460 <.0001 -0.0280 0.1848 0.8794 
Homeownership 
0.2536 0.0511 <.0001 0.2608 0.0513 <.0001 
Non-Retirement Investment  
0.1296 0.0515 0.0118 0.1331 0.0516 0.0099 
Intercept 
-0.0638 0.1693 0.7063 0.0146 0.1845 0.9368 
Control Variables 
Y Y 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.2133 0.2168 
N 4485 4485 








Table6. Pure effect and interaction (KH score split into two) 
variables Model13(Total) Model14 (Interaction term) 
  Estimate Standard error Pr > ChiSq Estimate Standard error Pr > ChiSq 
KH score (General FK) 0.1166 0.0315 0.0002 0.0713 0.0373 0.0561 
KH score (General FK) * Children to support 
   
0.1222 0.0572 0.0328 
Understanding of Life Insurance 0.1213 0.0429 0.0047 0.1233 0.0554 0.0261 
Understanding of Life Insurance * Children to support 
   
0.0008 0.0872 0.9926 
Financial Socialization 0.1924 0.0498 0.0001 0.2272 0.0636 0.0004 
Financial Socialization * Children to support 
   
-0.1029 0.0982 0.2948 
Propensity to Plan 0.0381 0.0125 0.0022 0.0226 0.0158 0.1527 
Propensity to Plan * Children to support 
   
0.0431 0.0254 0.0894 
Subjective FK 0.0396 0.0176 0.0244 0.0161 0.0223 0.4691 
Subjective FK * Children to support 
   
0.0701 0.0355 0.0487 
Children that I support financially 0.1825 0.0437 <.0001 -0.1494 0.1882 0.4273 
Homeownership 0.2346 0.0483 <.0001 0.1905 0.0596 0.0014 
Homeownership * Children to support 
   
0.1169 0.0861 0.1745 
Non-Retirement Investment  0.0933 0.0472 0.0482 0.0972 0.0474 0.0402 
Intercept -0.5972 0.1531 <.0001 -0.4856 0.1667 0.0036 
Control Variables Y Y 
N 5447 5447 







Table 7. Health Insurance Dependent Variable 
Variables Model15 (Total, Health) Model16 (FPL < 200%) Model17 (FPL +200%) 















KH score 0.2082 0.0355 <.0001 0.1351 0.0689 0.0498 0.2517 0.0425 <.0001 
KH score * Children to support -0.0295 0.0547 0.5895 0.0808 0.1064 0.4473 -0.1281 0.0688 0.0627 
Financial Socialization 0.2135 0.0654 0.0011 0.1871 0.1199 0.1186 0.2631 0.0793 0.0009 
Financial Socialization * Children to 
support 
-0.0673 0.1016 0.5078 0.0497 0.1815 0.7844 -0.185 0.1259 0.1418 
Propensity to Plan 0.0095 0.0162 0.5599 0.047 0.0292 0.1082 -0.0116 0.0197 0.5573 
Propensity to Plan * Children to support -0.0267 0.0263 0.3087 -0.0769 0.0458 0.0927 0.0083 0.0329 0.8018 
Subjective FK -0.0073 0.0223 0.7426 -0.0722 0.0371 0.0515 0.0291 0.0286 0.3089 
Subjective FK * Children to support 0.0485 0.0357 0.175 0.1246 0.0572 0.0294 -0.0123 0.048 0.7975 
Children that I support financially -0.2234 0.1788 0.2115 -0.6065 0.2776 0.0289 0.2033 0.2482 0.4129 
Homeownership 0.1688 0.0615 0.006 0.1809 0.1107 0.1021 0.1836 0.0763 0.0162 
Homeownership * Children to support 0.0209 0.0877 0.812 -0.1106 0.1543 0.4734 0.0128 0.1144 0.9108 
Non-Retirement Investment  0.2418 0.0535 <.0001 0.2151 0.1465 0.1421 0.2474 0.0581 <.0001 
Intercept 0.0766 0.1662 0.6448 0.5319 0.2636 0.0436 -0.0718 0.2908 0.8049 
Control Variables Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.2041 0.1579 0.1213 









Appendix A. Standardized Variables (Mean = 0, Std =1) 
Variables Model18 (Life Insurance) Model19 (FPL < 200%) Model20 (FPL + 200%) 
  Estimate Standard error Pr > ChiSq Estimate Standard error Pr > ChiSq Estimate Standard error Pr > ChiSq 
KH score 0.0868 0.0234 0.0002 0.0927 0.0496 0.0615 0.0796 0.0268 0.0029 
Financial Socialization 0.0787 0.0204 0.0001 0.1100 0.0414 0.0078 0.0712 0.0238 0.0028 
Propensity to Plan 0.064 0.0208 0.0021 0.0559 0.0422 0.1857 0.0687 0.0241 0.0044 
Subjective FK 0.0465 0.0216 0.0317 0.0152 0.0389 0.6951 0.0657 0.0268 0.0141 
Children that I support financially 0.1066 0.0220 <.0001 0.0420 0.0486 0.3875 0.1206 0.0251 <.0001 
Homeownership 0.1165 0.0241 <.0001 0.1699 0.0439 0.0001 0.0828 0.0295 0.0050 
Non-Retirement Investment  0.0422 0.0210 0.0446 0.1464 0.0661 0.0268 0.0360 0.0224 0.1069 
Intercept -0.0582 0.0185 0.0016 -0.8796 13.8795 0.9495 0.0292 0.0410 0.4767 
Control Variable Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.2306 0.1887 0.1704 











Appendix B Financial Well-Being and Life Insurance Demand  
variables Model21 (Total) Model22 (FPL <200%) Model23 (FPL +200%) 
  Estimate Standard error p-value Estimate Standard error p-value Estimate Standard error p-value 
Life Insurance 0.5161 0.3369 0.1256 1.2601 0.797 0.1141 0.3215 0.3658 0.3795 
KH score 1.0678 0.2358 <.0001 -0.6764 0.5288 0.2011 1.7485 0.2608 <.0001 
Financial Socialization 2.3327 0.4044 <.0001 1.5746 0.8616 0.0679 2.5186 0.4573 <.0001 
Propensity to Plan 0.7147 0.1004 <.0001 0.7643 0.2137 0.0004 0.642 0.1133 <.0001 
Subjective FK 2.4214 0.1413 <.0001 1.8268 0.2671 <.0001 2.7623 0.1706 <.0001 
Children that I support financially -1.9314 0.359 <.0001 -1.4535 0.8437 0.0852 -1.959 0.402 <.0001 
Homeownership 1.9019 0.4047 <.0001 -0.1648 0.7952 0.8359 3.2422 0.4777 <.0001 
Non-Retirement Investment  3.9621 0.3891 <.0001 6.5706 1.3871 <.0001 3.4716 0.3926 <.0001 
Intercept 38.6934 1.2273 <.0001 40.7892 2.3574 <.0001 37.1825 2.1215 <.0001 
Control Variables Y Y Y 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.3651 0.2074 0.3351 











Appendix C.  Principal Component analysis  
Propensity to Plan  PCA scores 
I consult my budget to see how much money I have left 0.4690 
I actively consider the steps I need to take to stick to my budget 0.5237 
I set financial goals for what I want to achieve with my money 0.4956 
I prepare a clear plan of action w/ detailed steps to achieve my financial goals 0.5101 
Model fit of PCA  
Eigenvalue 2.7746 
Proportion of variance explained by the component 0.6936 
 
Appendix D. Factor Analysis for Tetrachoric Correlation 
Financial Socialization Score 
Discussed family financial matters with me 0.1767 
Spoke to me about the importance of saving 0.2022 
Discussed how to establish a good credit rating 0.1908 
Taught me how to be a smart shopper 0.1938 
Taught me that my actions determine my success in life 0.1899 
Provided me with a regular allowance 0.1382 
Provided me with a savings account 0.1592 
Model fit of Factor Analysis   
Eigenvalue  4.4137 





Appendix E. KH Score and Understanding of Life Insurance 
Variables Names 
Knoll and Houts Financial Knowledge 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Pr > |t| 
KHKNOWL1 Understanding of long-term returns on investment 
Difficulty -0.31575 0.0334 <.0001 
 
 
Slope 1.04705 0.05464 <.0001 
KHKNOWL2 
Understanding of stocks vs bond vs savings volatility Difficulty -1.44908 0.05267 <.0001 
 
 
Slope 1.59982 0.09061 <.0001 
KHKNOWL3 
Understanding of benefits of diversification Difficulty -0.57313 0.0304 <.0001 
 
 
Slope 1.46812 0.07383 <.0001 
KHKNOWL4 
Understanding of possibility of stock market losses Difficulty -1.55963 0.0666 <.0001 
 
 
Slope 1.21747 0.06918 <.0001 
KHKNOWL5 Understanding of life insurance 
    
 
     
KHKNOWL6 Understanding of possibility of housing market losses 
Difficulty -2.09262 0.08813 <.0001 
 
 
Slope 1.51689 0.09997 <.0001 
KHKNOWL7 Understanding of credit card minimum payments 
Difficulty 0.4963 0.04185 <.0001 
 
 
Slope 0.88374 0.04999 <.0001 
KHKNOWL8 Understanding of relationship of bonds and interest rates 
Difficulty 1.48078 0.12152 <.0001 
 
 
Slope 0.52641 0.04274 <.0001 
KHKNOWL9 Understanding of mortgage term length on total interest paid 
Difficulty -1.8827 0.07362 <.0001 
  
  Slope 1.57557 0.0984 <.0001 
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